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From quantum code-making to quantum
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Clarendon Laboratory and Merton College, University of Oxford.
1 What is wrong with classical cryptography ?
Human desire to communicate secretly is at least as old as writing itself and
goes back to the beginnings of our civilisation. Methods of secret communica-
tion were developed by many ancient societies, including those of Mesopotamia,
Egypt, India, and China, but details regarding the origins of cryptology1 remain
unknown (Kahn 1967).
We know that it was the Spartans, the most warlike of the Greeks, who pio-
neered military cryptography in Europe. Around 400 BC they employed a device
known as a the scytale. The device, used for communication between military
commanders, consisted of a tapered baton around which was wrapped a spiral
strip of parchment or leather containing the message. Words were then written
lengthwise along the baton, one letter on each revolution of the strip. When
unwrapped, the letters of the message appeared scrambled and the parchment
was sent on its way. The receiver wrapped the parchment around another baton
of the same shape and the original message reappeared.
Julius Caesar allegedly used, in his correspondence, a simple letter substitu-
tion method. Each letter of Caesar’s message was replaced by the letter that
followed it alphabetically by three places. The letter A was replaced by D, the
letter B by E, and so on. For example, the English word COLD after the Caesar
substitution appears as FROG. This method is still called the Caesar cipher,
regardless the size of the shift used for the substitution.
These two simple examples already contain the two basic methods of en-
cryption which are still employed by cryptographers today namely transposition
and substitution. In transposition (e.g. scytale) the letters of the plaintext, the
technical term for the message to be transmitted, are rearranged by a special
permutation. In substitution (e.g. Caesar’s cipher) the letters of the plaintext
are replaced by other letters, numbers or arbitrary symbols. In general the two
1The science of secure communication is called cryptology from Greek kryptos hidden and
logos word. Cryptology embodies cryptography, the art of code-making, and cryptanalysis, the
art of code-breaking.
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techniques can be combined (for an introduction to modern cryptology see, for
example, (Menzes et al. 1996; Schneier 1994; Welsh 1988).
Originally the security of a cryptotext depended on the secrecy of the entire
encrypting and decrypting procedures; however, today we use ciphers for which
the algorithm for encrypting and decrypting could be revealed to anybody with-
out compromising the security of a particular cryptogram. In such ciphers a set
of specific parameters, called a key, is supplied together with the plaintext as
an input to the encrypting algorithm, and together with the cryptogram as an
input to the decrypting algorithm. This can be written as
Eˆk(P ) = C, and conversely, Dˆk(C) = P, (1.1)
where P stands for plaintext, C for cryptotext or cryptogram, k for cryptographic
key, and Eˆ and Dˆ denote an encryption and a decryption operation respectively.
The encrypting and decrypting algorithms are publicly known; the security
of the cryptogram depends entirely on the secrecy of the key, and this key must
consist of a randomly chosen, sufficiently long string of bits. Probably the best
way to explain this procedure is to have a quick look at the Vernam cipher, also
known as the one-time pad.
If we choose a very simple digital alphabet in which we use only capital letters
and some punctuation marks such as
A B C D E ... ... X Y Z ? , .
01 02 03 04 05 ... ... 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
we can illustrate the secret-key encrypting procedure by the following simple
example:
H E L L O R O G E R .
08 05 12 12 15 27 18 15 07 05 18 30
24 14 26 25 29 17 28 12 01 18 27 03
02 19 08 07 14 14 16 07 08 23 15 03
In order to obtain the cryptogram (sequence of digits in the bottom row)
we add the plaintext numbers (the top row of digits) to the key numbers (the
middle row), which are randomly selected from between 1 and 30, and take the
remainder after division of the sum by 30, that is we perform addition modulo 30.
For example, the first letter of the message “H” becomes a number “08”in the
plaintext, then we add 08+ 24 = 32 ; 32 = 1× 30+ 2, therefore we get 02 in the
cryptogram. The encryption and decryption can be written as P +k (mod 30) =
C and C − k (mod 30) = P respectively.
The cipher was invented by Major Joseph Mauborgne and AT&T’s Gilbert
Vernam in 1917 and we know that if the key is secure, the same length as the
message, truly random, and never reused, this cipher is really unbreakable! So
what is wrong with classical cryptography?
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There is a snag. It is called key distribution. Once the key is established,
subsequent communication involves sending cryptograms over a channel, even
one which is vulnerable to total passive eavesdropping (e.g. public announcement
in mass-media). However in order to establish the key, two users, who share
no secret information initially, must at a certain stage of communication use a
reliable and a very secure channel. Since the interception is a set of measurements
performed by the eavesdropper on this channel, however difficult this might be
from a technological point of view, in principle any classical key distribution can
always be passively monitored, without the legitimate users being aware that
any eavesdropping has taken place.
Cryptologists have tried hard to solve the key distribution problem. The
1970s, for example, brought a clever mathematical discovery in the shape of
“public key” systems (Diffie and Hellman 1977). In these systems users do not
need to agree on a secret key before they send the message. They work on the
principle of a safe with two keys, one public key to lock it, and another private
one to open it. Everyone has a key to lock the safe but only one person has a
key that will open it again, so anyone can put a message in the safe but only one
person can take it out. These systems exploit the fact that certain mathematical
operations are easier to do in one direction than the other. The systems avoid the
key distribution problem but unfortunately their security depends on unproven
mathematical assumptions, such as the difficulty of factoring large integers.2
This means that if and when mathematicians or computer scientists come up
with fast and clever procedures for factoring large integers the whole privacy
and discretion of public-key cryptosystems could vanish overnight. Indeed, recent
work in quantum computation shows that quantum computers can, at least in
principle, factor much faster than classical computers (Shor 1994) !
In the following I will describe how quantum entanglement, singled out by
Erwin Schro¨dinger (1935) as the most remarkable feature of quantum theory,
became an important resource in the new field of quantum data processing.
After a brief outline of entanglement’s key role in philosophical debates about
the meaning of quantum mechanics I will describe its current impact on both
cryptography and cryptanalysis. Thus this is a story about quantum code-
making and quantum code-breaking.
2 Is the Bell theorem of any practical use ?
Probably the best way to agitate a group of jaded but philosophically-inclined
physicists is to buy them a bottle of wine and mention interpretations of quan-
tum mechanics. It is like opening Pandora’s box. It seems that everybody agrees
with the formalism of quantum mechanics, but no one agrees on its meaning.
This is despite the fact that, as far as lip-service goes, one particular orthodoxy
established by Niels Bohr over 50 years ago and known as the “Copenhagen in-
2RSA - a very popular public key cryptosystem named after the three inventors, Ron Rivest,
Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman (1979) - gets its security from the difficulty of factoring
large numbers.
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terpretation” still effectively holds sway. It has never been clear to me how so
many physicists can seriously endorse a view according to which the equations
of quantum theory (e.g. the Schro¨dinger equation) apply only to un-observed
physical phenomena, while at the moment of observation a completely different
and mysterious process takes over. Quantum theory, according to this view, pro-
vides merely a calculational procedure and does not attempt to describe objective
physical reality. A very defeatist view indeed.
One of the first who found the pragmatic instrumentalism of Bohr unaccept-
able was Albert Einstein who, in 1927 during the fifth Solvay Conference in
Brussels, directly challenged Bohr over the meaning of quantum theory. The in-
telectual atmosphere and the philosophy of science at the time were dominated
by positivism which gave Bohr the edge, but Einstein stuck to his guns and
the Bohr-Einstein debate lasted almost three decades (after all they could not
use e-mail). In 1935 Einstein together with Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen
(EPR) published a paper in which they outlined how a ‘proper’ fundamental
theory of nature should look like (Einstein et al. 1935). The EPR programme
required completeness (“In a complete theory there is an element corresponding
to each element of reality”), locality (“The real factual situation of the system A
is independent of what is done with the system B, which is spatially separated
from the former”), and defined the element of physical reality as “If, without
in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty the value of a
physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding
to this physical quantity”. EPR then considered a thought experiment on two
entangled particles which showed that quantum states cannot in all situations be
complete descriptions of physical reality. The EPR argument, as subsequently
modified by David Bohm (1951), goes as follows. Imagine the singlet-spin state
of two spin 12 particles
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(| ↑〉 | ↓〉 − | ↓〉 | ↑〉) , (2.1)
where the single particle kets | ↑〉 and | ↓〉 denote spin up and spin down with
respect to some chosen direction. This state is spherically symmetric and the
choice of the direction does not matter. The two particles, which we label A and
B, are emitted from a source and fly apart. After they are sufficiently separated
so that they do not interact with each other we can predict with certainity the
x component of spin of particle A by measuring the x component of spin of
particle B. This is because the total spin of the two particles is zero and the spin
components of the two particles must have opposite values. The measurement
performed on particle B does not disturb particle A (by locality) therefore the x
component of spin is an element of reality according to the EPR criterion. By
the same argument and by the spherical symmetry of state |Ψ〉 the y, z, or any
other spin components are also elements of reality. However, since there is no
quantum state of a spin 12 particle in which all components of spin have definite
values the quantum description of reality is not complete.
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The EPR programme asked for a different description of quantum reality but
until John Bell’s (1964) theorem it was not clear whether such a description was
possible and if so whether it would lead to different experimental predictions.
Bell showed that the EPR propositions about locality, reality, and completeness
are incompatibile with some quantum mechanical predictions involving entangled
particles. The contradiction is revealed by deriving from the EPR programme
an experimentally testable inequality which is violated by certain quantum me-
chanical predictions. Extension of Bell’s original theorem by John Clauser and
Michael Horne (1974) made experimental tests of the EPR programme feasible
and quite a few of them have been performed. The experiments have supported
quantum mechanical predictions. Does this prove Bohr right? Not at all! The
refutation of the EPR programme does not give any credit to the Copenhagen in-
terpretation and simply shows that there is much more to ‘reality’, ‘locality’ and
‘completeness’ than the EPR envisaged (for a contemporary realist’s approach
see, for example, (Penrose 1989, 1994)).
What does it all have to do with data security? Surprisingly, a lot! It turns
out that the very trick used by Bell to test the conceptual foundations of quantum
theory can protect data transmission from eavesdroppers! Perhaps it sounds less
surprising when one recalls again the EPR definition of an element of reality:
“If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty the
value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality
corresponding to this physical quantity”. If this particular physical quantity is
used to encode binary values of a cryptographic key then all an eavesdropper
wants is an element of reality corresponding to the encoding observable (well,
at least this was my way of thinking about it back in 1990). Since then several
experiments have confirmed the ‘practical’ aspect of Bell’s theorem making it
quite clear that a border between blue sky and down-to-earth research is quite
blurred.
3 Quantum key distribution
The quantum key distribution which I am going to discuss here is based on dis-
tribution of entangled particles (Ekert 1991). Before I describe how the system
works let me mention that quantum cryptography does not have to be based
on quantum entanglement. In fact quite different approach based on partial in-
distinguishibility of non-orthogonal state vectors, pioneered by Stephen Wiesner
(1983), and subsequently by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard (1984), pre-
ceeded the entanglement-based quantum cryptography. Entanglement, however,
offers quite a broad repertoire of additional tricks such as, for example, ‘quantum
privacy amplification’ (Deutsch et al. 1996) which makes the entanglement-based
key distribution secure and operable even in presence of environmental noise.
The key distribution is performed via a quantum channel which consists of a
source that emits pairs of spin 12 particles in the singlet state as in Eq.(2.1). The
particles fly apart along the z-axis towards the two legitimate users of the chan-
nel, Alice and Bob, who, after the particles have separated, perform measure-
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ments and register spin components along one of three directions, given by unit
vectors ~ai and ~bj (i, j = 1, 2, 3), respectively for Alice and Bob. For simplicity
both ~ai and ~bj vectors lie in the x-y plane, perpendicular to the trajectory of the
particles, and are characterized by azimuthal angles: φa1 = 0, φ
a
2 =
1
4π, φ
a
3 =
1
2π
and φb1 =
1
4π, φ
b
2 =
1
2π, φ
b
3 =
3
4π. Superscripts “a” and “b” refer to Alice’s and
Bob’s analysers respectively, and the angle is measured from the vertical x-axis.
The users choose the orientation of the analysers randomly and independently
for each pair of the incoming particles. Each measurement, in 12 h¯ units, can yield
two results, +1 (spin up) and -1 (spin down), and can potentially reveal one bit
of information.
The quantity
E(~ai,~bj) = P++(~ai,~bj) + P−−(~ai,~bj)− P+−(~ai,~bj)− P−+(~ai,~bj) (3.1)
is the correlation coefficient of the measurements performed by Alice along
~ai and by Bob along ~bj . Here P±±(~ai,~bj) denotes the probability that result ±1
has been obtained along ~ai and ±1 along ~bj . According to the quantum rules
E(~ai,~bj) = −~ai ·~bj. (3.2)
For the two pairs of analysers of the same orientation (~a2, ~b1 and ~a3,~b2)
quantum mechanics predicts total anticorrelation of the results obtained by Alice
and Bob: E(~a2,~b1) = E(~a3,~b2) = −1.
One can define quantity S composed of the correlation coefficients for which
Alice and Bob used analysers of different orientation
S = E(~a1,~b1)− E(~a1,~b3) + E(~a3,~b1) + E(~a3,~b3). (3.3)
This is the same S as in the generalised Bell theorem proposed by Clauser,
Horne, Shimony, and Holt (1969) and known as the CHSH inequality. Quantum
mechanics requires
S = −2
√
2. (3.4)
After the transmission has taken place, Alice and Bob can announce in public
the orientations of the analysers they have chosen for each particular measure-
ment and divide the measurements into two separate groups: a first group for
which they used different orientation of the analysers, and a second group for
which they used the same orientation of the analysers. They discard all mea-
surements in which either or both of them failed to register a particle at all.
Subsequently Alice and Bob can reveal publicly the results they obtained but
within the first group of measurements only. This allows them to establish the
value of S, which if the particles were not directly or indirectly “ disturbed”
should reproduce the result of Eq.(3.4). This assures the legitimate users that
the results they obtained within the second second group of measurements are
anticorrelated and can be converted into a secret string of bits — the key.
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An eavesdropper, Eve, cannot elicit any information from the particles while
in transit from the source to the legitimate users, simply because there is no
information encoded there! The information “comes into being” only after the
legitimate users perform measurements and communicate in public afterwards.
Eve may try to substitute her own prepared data for Alice and Bob to misguide
them, but as she does not know which orientation of the analysers will be chosen
for a given pair of particles there is no good strategy to escape being detected. In
this case her intervention will be equivalent to introducing elements of physical
reality to the spin components and will lower S below its ‘quantum’ value. Thus
the Bell theorem can indeed expose eavesdroppers.
4 Quantum eavesdropping
The key distribution procedure described above is somewhat idealised. The prob-
lem is that there is in principle no way of distinguishing entanglement with an
eavesdropper (caused by her measurements) from entanglement with the envi-
ronment caused by innocent noise, some of which is presumably always present.
This implies that all existing protocols which do not address this problem are,
strictly speaking, inoperable in the presence of noise, since they require the trans-
mission of messages to be suspended whenever an eavesdropper (or, therefore,
noise) is detected. Conversely, if we want a protocol that is secure in the pres-
ence of noise, we must find one that allows secure transmission to continue even
in the presence of eavesdroppers. To this end, one might consider modifying
the existing protocols by reducing the statistical confidence level at which Alice
and Bob accept a batch of qubits. Instead of the extremely high level envisaged
in the idealised protocol, they would set the level so that they would accept
most batches that had encountered a given level of noise. They would then have
to assume that some of the information in the batch was known to an eaves-
dropper. It seems reasonable that classical privacy amplification (Bennett 1995)
could then be used to distill, from large numbers of such qubits, a key in whose
security one could have an any desired level of confidence. However, no such
scheme has yet been proved to be secure. Existing proofs of the security of clas-
sical privacy amplification apply only to classical communication channels and
classical eavesdroppers. They do not cover the new eavesdropping strategies that
become possible in the quantum case: for instance, causing a quantum ancilla
to interact with the encrypted message, storing the ancilla and later performing
a measurement on it that is chosen according to the data that Alice and Bob
exchange publicly. The security criteria for this type of eavesdropping has only
recently been analysed (Gisin and Huttner 1996, Fuchs et al. 1997, Cirac and
Gisin 1997).
The best way to analyse eavesdropping in the system is to adopt the scenario
that is most favourable for eavesdropping, namely where Eve herself is allowed to
prepare all the pairs that Alice and Bob will subsequently use to establish a key.
This way we take the most conservative view which attributes all disturbance in
the channel to eavesdropping even though most of it (if not all) may be due to
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an innocent environmental noise.
Let us start our analysis of eavesdropping in the spirit of the Bell theorem and
consider a simple case in which Eve knows precisely which particle is in which
state. Following (Ekert 1991) let us assume that Eve prepares each particle in
the EPR pairs separately so that each individual particle in the pair has a well
defined spin in some direction. These directions may vary from pair to pair so we
can say that she prepares with probability p(~na, ~nb) Alice’s particle in state |~na〉
and Bob’s particle in state |~nb〉, where ~na and ~nb are two unit vectors describing
the spin orientations. This kind of preparation gives Eve total control over the
state of individual particles. This is the case where Eve will always have the edge
and Alice and Bob should abandon establishing the key; they will learn about it
by estimating |S| which in this case will always be smaller than √2. To see this
let us write the density operator for each pair as
ρ =
∫
p(~na, ~nb) |~na〉 〈~na | ⊗ |~nb〉 〈~nb | d~nad~nb. (4.1)
Equation (3.3) with appropriately modified correlation coefficients reads
S =
∫
p(~na, ~nb)d~nad~nb [(~a1 · ~na)(~b1 · ~nb)− (~a1 · ~na)(~b3 · ~nb) +
(~a3 · ~na)(~b1 · ~nb) + (~a3 · ~na)(~b3 · ~nb)], (4.2)
and leads to
S =
∫
p(~na, ~nb)d~nad~nb[
√
2~na · ~nb] (4.3)
which implies
−
√
2 ≤ S ≤
√
2, (4.4)
for any state preparation described by the probability distribution p(~na, ~nb).
Clearly Eve can give up her perfect control of quantum states of individual
particles in the pairs and entangle at least some of them. If she prepared all
the pairs in perfectly entangled singlet states she would loose all her control and
knowledge about Alice’s and Bob’s data who can then easily establish a secret
key. This case is unrealistic because in practice Alice and Bob will never register
|S| = 2√2 . However, if Eve prepares only partially entangled pairs then it is
still possible for Alice and Bob to establish the key with an absolute security
provided they use a Quantum Privacy Amplification algorithm (QPA) (Deutsch
et al. 1996). The case of partially entangled pairs,
√
2 ≤ |S| ≤ 2√2, is the most
important one and in order to claim that we have an operable key distribution
scheme we have to prove that the key can be established in this particular case.
Skipping technical details I will present only the main idea behind the QPA,
details can be found in (Deutsch et al. 1996).
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Firstly, note that any two particles that are jointly in a pure state cannot be
entangled with any third physical object. Therefore any procedure that delivers
EPR-pairs in pure states must also have eliminated the entanglement between
any of those pairs and any other system. The QPA scheme is based on an
iterative quantum algorithm which, if performed with perfect accuracy, starting
with a collection of EPR-pairs in mixed states, would discard some of them
and leave the remaining ones in states converging to the pure singlet state. If
(as must be the case realistically) the algorithm is performed imperfectly, the
density operator of the pairs remaining after each iteration will not converge on
the singlet but on a state close to it, however, the degree of entanglement with
any eavesdropper will nevertheless continue to fall, and can be brought to an
arbitrary low value. The QPA can be performed by Alice and Bob at distant
locations by a sequence of local unitary operations and measurements which are
agreed upon by communication over a public channel and could be implemented
using technology that is currently being developed (c.f. (Turchette et al. 1995)).
The essential element of the QPA procedure is the ‘entanglement purification’
scheme, the idea originally proposed by Charles Bennett, Gilles Brassard, Sandu
Popescu, Benjamin Schumacher, John Smolin, and Bill Wootters (1996). It has
been shown recently that any partially entangled states of two-state particles
can be purified (Horodecki et al 1997). Thus as long as the density operator
cannot be written as a mixture of product states, i.e. is not of the form (4.1),
then Alice and Bob may outsmart Eve!
Finally let me mention that quantum cryptography today is more than a
theoretical curiosity. Experimental work in Switzerland (Muller et al. 1995), in
the U.K. (Townsend et al. 1996), and in the U.S.A. (Hughes et al. 1996, Franson
et al. 1995) shows that quantum data security should be taken seriously!
5 Public key cryptosystems
In the late 1970s Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman (1976) proposed an inter-
esting solution to the key distribution problem. It involved two keys, one public
key e for encryption and one private key d for decryption:
Eˆe(P ) = C, and Dˆd(C) = P. (5.1)
As I have already mentioned, in these systems users do not need to agree on
any key before they start sending messages to each other. Every user has his
own two keys; the public key is publicly announced and the private key is kept
secret. Several public-key cryptosystems have been proposed since 1976; here we
concentrate our attention on the most popular one, which was already mentioned
in Section 1, namely the RSA (Rivest et al. 1979) .
If Alice wants to send a secret message to Bob using the RSA system the
first thing she does is look up Bob’s personal public key in a some sort of yellow
pages or an RSA public key directory. This consists of a pair of positive integers
(e, n). The integer e may be relatively small, but n will be gigantic, say a couple
of hundred digits long. Alice then writes her message as a sequence of numbers
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using, for example, our digital alphabet from Section 1. This string of numbers is
subsequently divided into blocks such that each block when viewed as a number
P satisfies P ≤ n. Alice encrypts each P as
Eˆ(P ) = C = P e mod n. (5.2)
and sends the resulting cryptogram to Bob who can decrypt it by calculating
Dˆ(C) = P = Cd mod n. (5.3)
Of course, for this system to work Bob has to follow a special procedure to
generate both his private and public key:
• He begins with choosing two large (100 or more digits long) prime numbers
p and q, and a number e which is relatively prime to both p− 1 and q− 1.
• He then calculates n = pq and finds d such that ed = 1 mod (p − 1)(q −
1). This equation can be easily solved, for example, using the extended
Euclidean algorithm for the greatest common divisor. 3
• He releases to the public n and e and keeps p, q, and d secret.
The mathematics behind the RSA is a lovely piece of number theory which
goes back to the XVI century when a French lawyer Pierre de Fermat discovered
that if a prime p and a positive integer a are relatively prime, then
ap−1 = 1 mod p. (5.4)
A century later, Leonhard Euler found the more general relation
aφ(n) = 1 mod n, (5.5)
for relatively prime integers a and n. Here φ(n) is Euler’s φ function which
counts the number of positive integers smaller than n and coprime to n. Clearly
for any prime integer such as p or q we have φ(p) = p− 1 and φ(q) = q − 1; for
n = pq we obtain φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1). Thus the cryptogram C = P e mod n
can indeed be decrypted by Cd mod n = P ed mod n because ed = 1 mod φ(n);
hence for some integer k
P ed mod n = P kφ(n)+1 mod n = P. (5.6)
For example, let us suppose that Roger’s public key is (e, n) = (179, 571247). 4
He generated it following the prescription above choosing p = 773, q = 739 and
3Fortunately an easy and very efficient algorithm to compute the greatest common divisor
has been known since 300 BC. This truly ‘classical’ algorithm is described in Euclid’s Elements,
the oldest Greek treatise in mathematics to reach us in its entirety. Knuth (1981) provides an
extensive discussion of various versions of Euclid’s algorithm.
4Needless to say, number n in this example is too small to guarantee security, do not try
this public key with Roger.
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e = 179. The private key d was obtained by solving 179d = 1 mod 772×738 using
the extended Euclidean algorithm which yields d = 515627. Now if we want to
send Roger encrypted “HELLO ROGER.” we first use our digital alphabet from
Section 1 to obtain the plaintext which can be written as the following sequence
of six digit numbers
021908 071414 160708 231503. (5.7)
Then we encipher each block Pi by computing Ci = P
e
i mod n; e.g. the first
block P1 = 021908 will be eciphered as
P e1 mod n = 021908
179 mod 571247 = 540561 = C1, (5.8)
and the whole message is enciphered as:
540561 447313 033313 555657. (5.9)
The cryptogram C composed of blocks Ci can be send over to Roger. He can
then decrypt each block using his private key d = 515627, e.g. the first block is
decrypted as
540561515627 mod 571247 = 021908 = P1. (5.10)
In order to recover plaintext P from cryptogram C, an outsider, who knows
C, n, and e, would have to solve the congruence
P e mod n = C, (5.11)
for example, in our case,
P 1791 mod 571247 = 540561, (5.12)
which is hard, that is it is not known how to compute the solution efficiently
when n is a large integer (say 200 decimal digits long or more). However, if we
know the prime decomposition of n it is a piece of cake to figure out the private
key d; we simply follow the key generation procedure and solve the congruence
ed = 1 mod (p − 1)(q − 1). This can be done efficiently even when p and q are
very large. Thus, in principle, anybody who knows n can find d by factoring n,
but factoring big n is a hard problem. What does “hard” mean ?
6 Fast and slow algorithms
Difficulty of factoring grows rapidly with the size, i.e. number of digits, of a
number we want to factor. To see this take a number n with l decimal digits
(n ≈ 10l) and try to factor it by dividing it by 2, 3, . . .√n and checking the
remainder. In the worst case you may need approximately
√
n = 10l/2 divisions
to solve the problem - an exponential increase as a function of l. Now imagine
a computer capable of performing 1010 divisions per second. The computer can
then factor any number n, using the trial division method, in about
√
n/1010
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seconds. Take a 100-digit number n, so that n ≈ 10100. The computer will
factor this number in about 1040 seconds, much longer than 1017 seconds - the
estimated age of the Universe!
Skipping details of computational complexity I only mention that there is a
rigorous way of defining what makes an algorithm fast (and efficient) or slow
(and impractical) (see, for example (Welsh 1988)). For an algorithm to be con-
sidered fast, the time it takes to execute the algorithm must increase no faster
than a polynomial function of the size of the input. Informally think about the
input size as the total number of bits needed to specify the input to the prob-
lem, for example, the number of bits needed to encode the number we want to
factorise. If the best algorithm we know for a particular problem has execution
time (viewed as a function of the size of the input) bounded by a polynomial
then we say that the problem belongs to class P. Problems outside class P are
known as hard problems. Thus we say, for example, that multiplication is in P
whereas factorisation is apparently not in P and that is why it is a hard problem.
We can also design non-deterministic algorithms which may sometimes produce
incorrect solutions but have the property that the probability of error can be
made arbitrarily small. For example, the algorithm may produce a candidate
factor p of the input n followed by a trial division to check whether p really is a
factor or not. If the probability of error in this algorithm is ǫ and is independent
of the size of n then by repeating the algorithm k times, we get an algorithm
which will be successful with probability 1− ǫk (i.e. having at least one success).
This can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by choosing a fixed k sufficiently large.
There is no known efficient classical algorithm for factoring even if we allow
it to be probabilistic in the above senses. The fastest algorithms run in time
roughly of order exp((logn)1/3) and would need a couple of billions years to
factor a 200-digit number. It is not known whether a fast classical algorithm for
factorisation exists or not — none has yet been found.
It seems that factoring big numbers will remain beyond the capabilities of
any realistic computing devices and unless we come up with an efficient factoring
algorithm the public-key cryptosystems will remain secure. Or will they? As it
turns out we know that this is not the case; the classical, purely mathematical,
theory of computation is not complete simply because it does not describe all
physically possible computations. In particular it does not describe computations
which can be performed by quantum devices. Indeed, recent work in quantum
computation shows that a quantum computer, at least in principle, can efficiently
factor large integers (Shor 1994).
7 Quantum computers
Quantum computers can compute faster because they can accept as the input
not a single number but a coherent superposition of many different numbers
and subsequently perform a computation (a sequence of unitary operations) on
all of these numbers simultaneously. This can be viewed as a massive parallel
computation, but instead of having many processors working in parallel we have
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only one quantum processor performing a computation that affects all numbers
in a superposition i.e. all components of the input state vector.
The exponential speed-up of quantum computers takes place at the very
beginning of their computation. Qubits, i.e. physical systems which can be
prepared in one of the two orthogonal states labelled as | 0〉 and | 1〉 or in a
superposition of the two, can store superpositions of many ‘classical’ inputs. For
example, the equally weighted superposition of | 0〉 and | 1〉 can be prepared by
taking a qubit initially in state | 0〉 and applying to it transformation H (also
known as the Hadamard transform) which maps
| 0〉 −→ 1√
2
(| 0〉+ | 1〉), (7.1)
| 1〉 −→ 1√
2
(| 0〉 − | 1〉), (7.2)
If this transformation is applied to each qubit in a register composed of two
qubits it will generate the superposition of four numbers
| 0〉 | 0〉 −→ 1√
2
(| 0〉+ | 1〉) 1√
2
(| 0〉+ | 1〉) (7.3)
= 12 (| 00〉+ | 01〉+ | 10〉+ | 11〉). (7.4)
where 00 can be viewed as binary for 0, 01 binary for 1, 10 binary for 2 and
finally 11 as binary for 3. In general a quantum register composed of l qubits
can be prepared in a superposition of 2l different numbers (inputs) with only l
elementary operations. This can be written, in decimal rather than in binary
notation, as
| 0〉 −→ 2−l/2
2l−1∑
x=0
|x〉 . (7.5)
Thus l elementary operations generate exponentially many, that is 2l different
inputs!
The next task is to process all the inputs in parallel within the superposition
by a sequence of unitary operations. Let us describe now how quantum comput-
ers compute functions. For this we will need two quantum registers of length l
and k. Consider a function
f : {0, 1, ... 2l − 1} −→ {0, 1, ... 2k − 1}. (7.6)
A classical computer computes f by evolving each labelled input, 0, 1, ..., 2l−1
into a respective labelled output, f(0), f(1), ..., f(2l − 1). Quantum computers,
due to the unitary (and therefore reversible) nature of their evolution, compute
functions in a slightly different way. In order to compute functions which are
not one-to-one and to preserve the reversibility of computation, quantum com-
puters have to keep the record of the input. Here is how it is done. The first
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register is loaded with value x i.e. it is prepared in state |x〉, the second register
may initially contain an arbitrary number y. The function evaluation is then
determined by an appropriate unitary evolution of the two registers,
|x〉 | y〉 Uf−→ |x〉 | y + f(x)〉 . (7.7)
Here y + f(x) means addition modulo the maximum number of configurations
of the second register, i.e. 2k in our case.
The computation we are considering here is not only reversible but also quan-
tum and we can do much more than computing values of f(x) one by one. We can
prepare a superposition of all input values as a single state and by running the
computation Uf only once, we can compute all of the 2
l values f(0), . . . , f(2l−1),
(here and in the following we ignore the normalisation constants),
2l−1∑
x=0
|x〉 | y〉 Uf−→ | y + f〉 =
2l−1∑
x=0
|x〉 | y + f(x)〉 . (7.8)
It looks too good to be true so where is the catch? How much information
about f does the state
| f〉 = | 0〉 | f(0)〉+ | 1〉 | f(1)〉+ . . .+
∣∣ 2l − 1〉 ∣∣ f(2l − 1)〉 (7.9)
really contain?
Unfortunately no quantum measurement can extract all of the 2l values
f(0), f(1), . . . , f(2l− 1) from | f〉. If we measure the two registers after the com-
putation Uf we register one output |x〉 | y + f(x)〉 for some value x. However,
there are measurements that provide us with information about joint properties
of all the output values f(x), such as, for example, periodicity, without provid-
ing any information about particular values of f(x). Let us illustrate this with
a simple example.
Consider a Boolean function f which maps {0, 1} → {0, 1}. There are exactly
four functions of this type: two constant functions (f(0) = f(1) = 0 and f(0) =
f(1) = 1) and two balanced functions (f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1 and f(0) = 1, f(1) =
0). Is it possible to compute function f only once and to find out whether it
is constant or balanced i.e. whether the binary numbers f(0) and f(1) are the
same or different? N.B. we are not asking for particular values f(0) and f(0)
but for a global property of f .
Classical intuition tells us that we have to evaluate both f(0) and f(1), that
is to compute f twice. This is not so. Quantum mechanics allows us to perform
the trick with a single function evaluation. We simply take two qubits, each
qubit serves as a single qubit register, prepare the first qubit in state | 0〉 and
the second in state | 1〉 and compute
| 0〉 | 1〉 −→ (| 0〉+ | 1〉)(| 0〉 − | 1〉) −→
−→ | 0〉 (| f(0)〉 − | 1 + f(0)〉) + | 1〉 (| f(1)〉 − | 1 + f(1)〉). (7.10)
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We start with transformation H applied both to the first and the second qubit,
followed by the function evaluation. Here 1+f(0) denotes addition modulo 2 and
simply means taking the negation of f(0). At this stage, depending on values
f(0) and f(1), we have one of the four possible states of the two qubits. We
apply H again to the first and the second qubit and evolve the four states as
follows
(| 0〉+ | 1〉)(| 0〉 − | 1〉) −→ + | 0〉 | 1〉 , (7.11)
(| 0〉+ | 1〉)(| 1〉 − | 0〉) −→ − | 0〉 | 1〉 , (7.12)
| 0〉 (| 0〉 − | 1〉) + | 1〉 (| 1〉 − | 0〉) −→ + | 1〉 | 1〉 , (7.13)
| 0〉 (| 1〉 − | 0〉) + | 1〉 (| 0〉 − | 1〉) −→ − | 1〉 | 1〉 . (7.14)
The second qubit returns to its initial state | 1〉 but the first qubit contains the
relevant information. We measure its bit value — if we register ‘0’ the function
is constant if we register ‘1’ the function is balanced !
This example, due to Richard Cleve, Artur Ekert and Chiara Macchiavello
(1996), is an improved version of the first quantum algorithm proposed by David
Deutsch (1985) and communicated to the Royal Society by Roger Penrose. (The
original Deutsch algorithm provides the correct answer with probability 50% .)
Deutsch’s paper laid the foundation for the new field of quantum computation.
Since then quantum algorithms have been steadily improved and in 1994 Peter
Shor came up with the efficient quantum factoring algorithm which, at least in
theory, leads us directly to quantum cryptanalysis.
8 Quantum code-breaking
Shor’s quantum factoring of an integer n is based on calculating the period of
the function Fn(x) = a
x mod n for a randomly selected integer a between 0 and
n. It turns out that for increasing powers of a, the remainders form a repeating
sequence with a period which we denote r. Once r is known the factors of n are
obtained by calculating the greatest common divisor of n and ar/2 ± 1.
Suppose we want to factor 15 using this method. Let a = 11. For increasing
x the function 11x mod 15 forms a repeating sequence 1, 11, 1, 11, 1, 11, . . .. The
period is r = 2, and ar/2 mod 15 = 11. Then we take the greatest common
divisor of 10 and 15, and of 12 and 15 which gives us respectively 5 and 3, the
two factors of 15. Classically calculating r is at least as difficult as trying to
factor n; the execution time of calculations grows exponentially with number of
digits in n. Quantum computers can find r in time which grows only as a cubic
function of the number of digits in n.
To estimate the period r we prepare two quantum registers; the first register,
with l qubits, in the equally weighted superposition of all numbers it can contain,
and the second register in state zero. Then we perform an arithmetical operation
that takes advantage of quantum parallelism by computing the function Fn(x)
for each number x in the superposition. The values of Fn(x) are placed in the
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second register so that after the computation the two registers become entangled:
∑
x
|x〉 | 0〉 −→
∑
x
|x〉 |Fn(x)〉 (8.1)
Now we perform a measurement on the second register. We measure each qubit
and obtain either ”0” or ”1” . This measurement yields value Fn(k) (in binary
notation) for some randomly selected k. The state of the first register right after
the measurement, due to the periodicity of Fn(x), is a coherent superposition of
all states |x〉 such that x = k, k+r, k+2r, . . ., i.e. all x for which Fn(x) = Fn(k).
The periodicity in the probability amplitudes in the first register cannot be
simply measured because the offset i.e. the value k is randomly selected by
the measurement. However the state of the first register can be subsequently
transformed via a unitary operation which effectivelly removes the offset and
modifies the period in the probability amplitudes from r to a multiple of 2l/r.
This operation is known as the quantum Fourier transform (QFT) and can be
written as
QFTs : |x〉 7−→ 2−l/2
2l−1∑
y=0
exp(2πiac/2l) | y〉 . (8.2)
After QFT the first register is ready for the final measurement which yields
with high probability an integer which is the best whole approximation of a
multiple of 2l/r i.e. x = k2l/r for some integer k. We know the measured value
x and the size of the register l hence if k and r are coprime we can determine
r by canceling x/2l down to an irreducible fraction and taking its denominator.
Since the probability that k and r are coprime is sufficiently large (greater than
1/ log r for large r) this gives an efficient randomized algorithm for determination
of r. More detailed description of Shor’s algorithm can be found in (Shor 1994)
and in (Ekert and Jozsa 1996).
Let me mention in passing that there exists a direct quantum attack on RSA
which does not require factoring, but employs Shor’s algorithm to determine the
order of cryptogram modulo n (Mosca and Ekert 1997).
An open question has been whether it would ever be practical to build physi-
cal devices to perform such computations, or whether they would forever remain
theoretical curiosities. Quantum computers require a coherent, controlled evolu-
tion for a period of time which is necessary to complete the computation. Many
view this requirement as an insurmountable experimental problem, however, the
technological progress may prove them wrong (see review papers e.g. (DiVin-
cenzo 1995; Ekert and Jozsa 1996; Lloyd 1993, 1995)). When the first quantum
factoring devices are built the security of classical public-key cryptosystems will
vanish. But, as was pointed by Roger Penrose, by the time we acquire desk-top
quantum computers we will probably be able to construct quantum public-key
cryptosystems with security based on quantum rather than classical computa-
tional complexity. Meanwhile thumbs up for quantum cryptography.
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9 Concluding remarks
In the last decade quantum entanglement became a sought-after physical re-
source which allows us to perform qualitatively new types of data processing.
Here I have described the role of entanglement in connection with data security
and have skipped many other fascinating application such as quantum teleporta-
tion (Bennett et al. 1993), quantum dense coding (Bennett and Wiesner 1992),
entanglement swapping (Zukowski et al. 1993), quantum error correction (Shor
1995; Steane 1996; Ekert and Macchiavello 1996; Calderbank and Shor 1996;
Bennett et al. 1996, Laflamme et al. 1996), fault tolerant quantum comput-
ing (Shor 1996; DiVincenzo and Shor 1996) and only mentioned in passing the
entanglement purification (Bennett et al. 1996) and quantum privacy amplifi-
cation (Deutsch et al 1996). There is much more to say about some peculiar
features of two- and many-particle entanglement and there is even an interest-
ing geometry behind it such as, for example, the ‘magic dedocahedra’ (Penrose
1994). Even the ‘simplest’ three-particle entangled states, the celebrated GHZ
states of three qubits (Greenberger et al. 1989) such as | 000〉 ± | 111〉, have
interesting properties; the three particles are all together entangled but none of
the two qubits in the triplet are entangled. That is, the pure GHZ state of three
particles is entangled as a whole but the reduced density operator of any of the
pairs is separable. This is very reminicent of some geometric constructions such
as “Odin’s triangle” or “Borromean rings” (Aravind 1997). This and many other
interesting properties of multi-particle entanglement have been recently studied
by Sandu Popescu (1997) and (in a disguised form as quantum error correction)
by Rob Calderbank, Eric Rains, Peter Shor, and Neil Sloane (1996). Despite
a remarkable progress in this field it seems to me that we still know very lit-
tle about the nature of quantum entanglement; we can hardly agree on how to
classify, quantify and measure it (but c.f. (Horodecki 1997; Vedral et al.1997).
Clearly we should be prepared for even more surprises both in understanding
and in utilisation of this precious quantum resource.
In this quest to understand the quantum theory better and better Roger
Penrose has played a very prominent role in defending the realist’s view of the
quantum world. I would like to thank him for this.
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